

Safe Options Induce Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes



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Are women more risk averse than men?


Are women more risk averse than men?

yes, *of course*


Are women more risk averse than men?


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statistical significance $\Rightarrow$ stylized fact $\Rightarrow$ fact



(source: Filippin & Crosetto, *Management Science*)





Are women more risk averse than men?

yes *but...*

Are women more risk averse than men?

yes *but...*

...it depends on the **task** used.

Holt & Laury	rarely
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task	never
Eckel & Grossmann	always
Gneezy & Potters Investment Game	~always
~ 100 experiments in psychology	about 50%

Why?

Why?

Are there specific characteristics of the task that trigger different behavior by gender?

Which ones?


If so, can we rationalize them with some specific non-EUT model (loss aversion, certainty effect, salience, regret)?

conjecture: **safe options**

Holt & Laury	rarely	not focal
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task	never	no
Eckel & Grossmann	always	yes, focal
Gneezy & Potters Investment Game	~always	yes, focal
~ 100 experiments in psychology	about 50%	...


The road to causal evidence

- Experimentally manipulate presence & salience of safe option
- *Ceteris paribus*
- Do so in more than one task (task heterogeneity is huge)



(source: Pedroni et al., *Nature Human Behavior*)

Experimental data: 4 tasks with similar stakes



(source: Crosetto & Filippin, *Experimental Economics*)

Task	N_{task}	Version	N	Males	Females
Holt & Laury	344	Baseline: <i>HL</i>	179	84	95
		Treatment: <i>HLsafe</i>	165	79	86
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task	462	Baseline: <i>BRET</i>	271	106	165
		Treatment: <i>BRETsafe</i>	191	73	118
Eckel & Grossman	279	Baseline: <i>EGsafe</i>	145	67	78
		Treatment: <i>EGnosafe</i>	134	57	77


Holt & Laury (2002)

Standard Holt & Laury


Option A					Option B			
1	1/10	4 €	9/10	3.2 €	1/10	7.7 €	9/10	0.2 €
2	2/10	4 €	8/10	3.2 €	2/10	7.7 €	8/10	0.2 €
3	3/10	4 €	7/10	3.2 €	3/10	7.7 €	7/10	0.2 €
4	4/10	4 €	6/10	3.2 €	4/10	7.7 €	6/10	0.2 €
5	5/10	4 €	5/10	3.2 €	5/10	7.7 €	5/10	0.2 €
6	6/10	4 €	4/10	3.2 €	6/10	7.7 €	4/10	0.2 €
7	7/10	4 €	3/10	3.2 €	7/10	7.7 €	3/10	0.2 €
8	8/10	4 €	2/10	3.2 €	8/10	7.7 €	2/10	0.2 €
9	9/10	4 €	1/10	3.2 €	9/10	7.7 €	1/10	0.2 €
10	10/10	4 €	0/10	3.2 €	10/10	7.7 €	0/10	0.2 €

Holt & Laury with a safe option

	Option A		Option B		
1	3.3 €	1/10	7.7 €	9/10	0.2 €
2	3.4 €	2/10	7.7 €	8/10	0.2€
3	3.5 €	3/10	7.7 €	7/10	0.2€
4	3.5 €	4/10	7.7 €	6/10	0.2€
5	3.6 €	5/10	7.7 €	5/10	0.2€
6	3.7 €	6/10	7.7 €	4/10	0.2€
7	3.7 €	7/10	7.7 €	3/10	0.2€
8	3.8 €	8/10	7.7 €	2/10	0.2€
9	3.9 €	9/10	7.7 €	1/10	0.2€
10	4 €	10/10	7.7 €	0/10	0.2€



		N	Average # safe choices	Std. Dev.	Cohen's d	Mann Whitney
<i>HL</i>	M	74	5.70	1.61	.19	.183
	F	77	6.03	1.84		
	<i>M-F</i>		<i>-0.33</i>			
<i>HLsafe</i>	M	76	5.66	1.47	.43	.004
	F	83	6.24	1.26		
	<i>M-F</i>		<i>-0.58</i>			




Holt & Laury (2002)



Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (2013)

Standard BRET



The game interface features a 10x10 grid of squares. The top row is missing the first square, leaving 9 squares. The remaining 9 rows are complete, each containing 10 squares. The squares are arranged in a checkerboard pattern of light and dark gray. The top row has 9 squares, and the rest of the grid is a full 9x10 block.


Euro: 1.4


Boxes collected so far
14

Boxes still to collect
86

 **Stop**

BRET with safe option





		N	Average Choice	Std. Dev.	Cohen's d	Mann Whitney
<i>BRET</i>	M	105	46.38	13.3	-.018	.675
	F	164	46.65	16.3		
	<i>M-F</i>		-.27			
<i>BRETsafe</i>	M	73	49.79	12.7	.254	.079
	F	118	46.72	11.8		
	<i>M-F</i>		3.07			

Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (2013)




Eckel & Grossman (2002,2008)

Standard EG

	Event	Probability	Outcome
1	A	50%	4 €
	B	50%	4 €
2	A	50%	6 €
	B	50%	3 €
3	A	50%	8 €
	B	50%	2 €
4	A	50%	10 €
	B	50%	1 €
5	A	50%	12 €
	B	50%	0 €

EG with no safe option

	Event	Probability	Outcome
1	A	50%	4.5 €
	B	50%	3.6 €
2	A	50%	6 €
	B	50%	3 €
3	A	50%	8 €
	B	50%	2 €
4	A	50%	10 €
	B	50%	1 €
5	A	50%	12 €
	B	50%	0 €



		N	Average Choice	Std. Dev.	Cohen's d	Mann Whitney
Safe	M	67	3.22	1.38	.61	.001
	F	78	2.46	1.15		
	<i>M-F</i>		.76			
Non-Safe	M	57	3.33	1.27	.58	.001
	F	77	2.62	1.20		
	<i>M-F</i>		.71			

Eckel & Grossman (2002,2008)



What if we just ask them?

Task	Condition		SOEP mean	SOEP st.dev.	MW p-value
HL	Baseline	M	5.56	1.98	< .001
		F	4.55	2.02	
	HLsafe	M	5.08	2.26	.003
		F	4.1	1.87	
BRET	Baseline	M	5.36	1.95	.036
		F	4.84	2.06	
	BRETsafe	M	5.15	2.31	.013
		F	4.34	1.89	
EG	EGnosafe	M	5.39	2.29	.029
		F	4.57	2.02	
	EGsafe	M	5.39	2.06	.179
		F	4.95	2.19	

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Can we setup a **structural** model?

- $u(x) = \frac{x^{1-\rho}}{\rho}$
- Discretized data
- Fechner error (μ)
- Hey-Orme specification
- Standard error clustered at individual level
- ρ and μ allowed to interact with female

	(1) BRET	(2) BRETsafe	(3) HL	(4) HLsafe	(5) EGnosafe	(6) EGsafe
ρ	0.21*** (0.06)	0.049 (0.07)	0.72*** (0.1)	0.67*** (0.08)	0.45*** (0.09)	0.46*** (0.08)
ρ_{female}	-0.024 (0.07)	0.13* (0.08)	0.019 (0.07)	0.12** (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.05)
ρ_{SOEP}	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.0086 (0.007)	-0.049*** (0.02)	-0.044*** (0.01)	-0.028** (0.01)	-0.030** (0.01)
μ	0.16*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.67*** (0.1)	0.60*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.06)
μ_{female}	0.036 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.07)	0.059 (0.1)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.027 (0.08)	0.098 (0.09)
μ_{easy}	0.00065 (0.004)	-0.00035 (0.006)	0.059* (0.04)	0.051* (0.03)	0.029* (0.02)	-0.012 (0.02)
N	208	191	164	164	134	145
Log likelihood	-5274	-4132	-545	-425	-296	-321

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Safe options **do** generate a gender effect.

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Why?

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Loss aversion yes $\Rightarrow$ but mostly in HL

Prospect theory structural model

	(1) BRETsafe		(2) HLsafe	
ρ	-0.026	(0.05)	0.80***	(0.2)
ρ_{female}	0.046	(0.04)	0.10	(0.2)
ρ_{SOEP}	-0.013	(0.01)	-0.18***	(0.04)
λ	1.13***	(0.1)	1.85***	(0.1)
λ_{female}	0.19	(0.1)	0.45**	(0.2)
μ	0.39***	(0.04)	1.44***	(0.2)
μ_{female}	-0.041	(0.05)	-0.019	(0.2)
μ_{easy}	-0.00046	(0.01)	0.13*	(0.08)
Observations	191		164	
Log likelihood	-4101		-429	

St.err. in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Certainty effect	somewhat	⇒ change is elsewhere
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Salience theory	no	⇒ weird predictions

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...other ideas?...	...	...

Is this an important result?

Thanks!