

The Rise and Fall of Asymmetric Dominance

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€: INRA Jeune Chercheur



\$7



\$3



\$7



\$7



\$3




\$7
Target



\$7
decoy



\$3
Competitor



ADE:

an **increase** in the *choice share* of the **target**
in **absence** vs. in **presence** of a decoy.

\$7
Target

\$7
decoy

\$3
Competitor


Why do we care?

- ▶ (for the money oriented):
wide marketing implications

Why do we care?

- ▶ (for the money oriented):
wide marketing implications
- ▶ (for nerds economists):
violation of Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives

Standard ADE design



- ▶ Hypothetical
- ▶ 2-attribute choices
- ▶ Indifference
- ▶ Between-subjects
- ▶ Aggregate measure

difference in choice share of **target** in **absence** vs **presence** of **decoy**.

Evidence for ADE

Widely replicated (in marketing & social psychology mainly)

- ▶ In hypothetical **product** choices [dozens of papers]
- ▶ In **political** opinions in Finland [Herne]
- ▶ In **animals** honeybees, gray jays, slime mold [Shafir et al]

Yet, not very robust

- ▶ **Small or no** effect when:
 - ▶ products carry **brand name** [Ratneshwar et al., 1987]
 - ▶ product **description** is very **precise** [Mishra et al., 1993]
 - ▶ **visual** rather than numerical dimensions [Frederick et al., 2014]
 - ▶ away from **indifference** [Crosetto and Gaudeul 2016]
 - ▶ in **real-world** choices [Trendl et al., 2018]
- ▶ **Large(r)** effect when:
 - ▶ subjects asked to **justify** choices [Simonson, 1989]
 - ▶ **dominance** is made more **focal** [Mishra et al., 1993; Król and Król, 2019]

This paper: what?

Testing the **theoretical nature** of the ADE:

Bias?

Heuristic?

Artifact?

This paper: what?

Testing the **theoretical nature** of the ADE:

Bias?

Serious challenge to IIA

Heuristic?

IIA mostly fine


Artifact?

No problem

Three main novelties:

1. **Within-subjects**: we can **measure** ADE and not just *show* it
2. **Induced** preferences allow us to **manipulate** indifference
3. **Time and choice process**: does ADE *survive* in the longer run?


Within-subject design




Time and choice process: exposing the *choice process*


\forall subject, \forall choice, we want to capture


- ▶ the fast heuristics used (if any)
- ▶ *and* the slow reasoning applied (if any)
- ▶ *and* the moment the subject switched (if any)











(adapted from Caplin et al., *Search and Satisficing*, AER 2011; also applied to guessing games (Agranov et al., JESA 2015); social preferences (Dyrkacz Krawczyk JBEE 2017))

Expected behavior

- ▶ No choice \Rightarrow random choice: incentive to *fast* reply
- ▶ Time is ticking: incentive to *change* first decision upon reflection


Notes:

- ▶ fast to slow *endogenous* (usually: exogenous)
- ▶ Data reveal choice *process* (usually: outcome)


Induced preferences

Vous devez acheter 3 litres d'essence. Quelle est l'option la moins chère ?


3 / 40



3.09€



1.17€



1.40€



Notes

- ▶ Problem is *spuriously* bidimensional (**size, price**)
- ▶ But actually *monodimensional* (**money**)
- ▶ (*unobservable*) utility weighting \Rightarrow (**observable**) cognitive exercise
- ▶ *no* homegrown preferences
- ▶ The optimal choice is always **computable**
- ▶ (but somehow hidden to subjects)

Experimental details

- ▶ Each subject faces 40 screens
- ▶ random order of screens; random position of the decoy
- ▶ 111 consumers ["real people"]
- ▶ Grenoble area, south-eastern France
- ▶ 10€ show-up fee + earnings in the task (Average 10€)


ADE:

the **difference** in the *choice share* of the **target**
in **absence** vs. in **presence** of a decoy.

Aggregate results: choices


Extra choices of target in presence of a decoy

% points, treatment vs 2-option control, no choices counted in




seconds

Classic comparison: 2vs3




1.43€




3.16€


vs



1.43€




1.72€




3.16€

Extra choices of target in presence of a decoy


% points, treatment vs 2-option control, no choices counted in




New comparison: 3vs3



0.95€




3.15€




2.09€


vs



0.95€




1.13€




2.09€

Extra choices of target in presence of a decoy

% points, treatment vs 3-option control, no choices counted in



Extra choices of target by target relative price




Take home message


- ▶ ADE is present in the first seconds of choice
- ▶ then it converges to \sim zero
- ▶ true irrespective of target relative price

Aggregate results: payoffs

Difference in payoff in time -- with decoy choices



Difference in payoff in time -- decoy choices dropped



Take home message

- ▶ Dominance allows to spot and eliminate decoy
- ▶ Subjects pay a (*small*) price for ADE
- ▶ But only in the short run
- ▶ on top of this, no other effect on payoffs

Modeling choices

Modeling strategy

1. Structural model of choice to:

- ▶ assess which strategy is followed
- ▶ jointly estimate choice accuracy and heuristics
- ▶ estimate value of *no choice*

2. Mixture model to:

- ▶ allow subjects to be of different types
- ▶ heuristic (fast) *or* maximizer (slow) *or* Fast *then* slow
- ▶ estimate shares of types in population

Structural model

- Utility of options at time t depends on type and unit price

$$U(x_t) = f(type) \cdot (-up);$$

$$up = \frac{\text{shownprice}}{\text{quantity}}$$

$$f(type) = \begin{cases} \text{competitor} & 1 + \text{malus}_c(t) \\ \text{decoy} & 1 + \text{malus}_d(t) \\ \text{nochoice} & v_t \end{cases}$$

- Utility of options at time t depends on type and unit price

$$U(x_t) = f(type) \cdot (-up);$$





$$up = \frac{\text{shownprice}}{\text{quantity}}$$

$$f(type) = \begin{cases} \text{competitor} & 1 + malus_c(t) \\ \text{decoy} & 1 + malus_d(t) \\ \text{nochoice} & v_t \end{cases}$$


- We add an extreme-value distribution of error (accuracy parameter):

$$U(x) = \frac{\exp(\lambda_t U(x))}{\exp(\sum_i \lambda_t U_i)}$$

- We estimate the model for 5 4-second bins



Effect by markup




Take home message

- ▶ Precision increases over time.
- ▶ Elimination of dominated alternatives right at the beginning.
- ▶ "no choice" value goes to zero relatively late – subjects like to think
- ▶ Effect **disappears** away from indifference

Mixture model

ADE dynamics by type




3 decision types

Heuristic only (H): estimate bonus, malus, precision, just for *one* period

Maximisers (M): have bonus = malus = 0, do not use dominance

Fast *then* Slow (HM): first H, then M

Type assignment



Who makes up the types?

Base category: Fast then Slow				
	Heuristic		Maximiser	
CRT score	-1.0**	[-1.7, -0.2]	-0.1	[-0.6, 0.5]
Risk tolerance	0.3**	[0.005, 0.6]	0.2	[-0.1, 0.4]
Student	0.2	[-2.2, 2.7]	-2.7**	[-5.0, -0.4]
Worker	1.8	[-0.6, 4.2]	-1.2	[-3.6, 1.2]
Education level	0.2	[-0.3, 0.7]	1.1***	[0.3, 1.9]
Econ student	1.8**	[0.4, 3.1]	-0.6	[-2.0, 0.8]
Age	0.1**	[0.003, 0.2]	-0.2	[-0.4, 0.1]
Revenue	-0.9	[-2.7, 1.0]	-2.5**	[-4.7, -0.3]
Constant	-6.4***[-11.2, -1.6]		1.9	[-4.4, 8.1]
Akaike Inf. Crit.	190.0		190.0	

Note: 95% CI in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Take home message

- ▶ Subjects are different.
- ▶ Most subjects show ADE as a short-term strategy, then change.
- ▶ We have some (sensible) predictors of types

What did we learn?

Two *alternative* interpretations

For ~~nerds~~ economists

ADE is a **heuristic** and IIA is saved (in the long run)


- ▶ used in the early stages of the decision process
- ▶ disappears upon reflection
- ▶ majority of subjects fast *then* slow
- ▶ $\sim \frac{1}{4}$ of subjects use ADE only

For ~~nerds~~ psychologists

ADE is still present in a **hostile** environment

- ▶ there exist clear and unique best option
- ▶ there is no actual utility trade-off
- ▶ in the real world *a fortiori* reliance on heuristic
- ▶ a full $\sim \frac{1}{4}$ use ADE only!

For all the others

A portrait of a man with a beard and mustache, wearing a dark suit and tie. He is looking slightly to the right with a faint smile.

You can fool *some* people **some time**

But you cannot fool *all* the people **all the time**



THANKS